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Donat Pharand*

Canada's Arctic Jurisdiction
in International Law

I. Introduction
The purpose of this study is to make a brief overview of Canada's
jurisdiction in the arctic regions, jurisdiction which has developed
since the transfer of the Arctic Islands to Canada by Great Britain in
1880. The study will concentrate on Canada's jurisdiction over the
water areas of the Arctic, but will also cover the status of the other
areas involved. More specifically, the areas to be covered are:
1) the islands; 2) the continental shelf; 3) the waters in general;
4) the Northwest Passage; and 5) the airspace.
II. Canada'sJurisdictionOver the Arctic Islands
Since the transfer of title from Great Britain in 1870 and 1880,
Canada's sovereignty over the whole of the Arctic Archipelago has
been completed and consolidated by official Canadian expeditions
and various state activities carried out over the years by government
officials, in particular, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
Canada's title to the Arctic Islands was doubted on two occasions at
most, once by Denmark and the other time by Norway. In 1920,
after the Canadian government had requested that Denmark restrain
its Eskimos from killing musk-oxen on Ellesmere Island because it
feared the extinction of the oxen, the Danish government stated in
its reply that it thought it could subscribe to the view, expressed by
the Danish explorer, Rasmussen, that Ellesmere Island was "no
man's land". 1 This resulted in an appropriate communication being
sent to Denmark by Great Britain on behalf, and at the request, of
Canada, and Denmark did not pursue the matter after that. The fact
that, at about the same time, Great Britain recognized Denmark's
sovereignty over Greenland might also have helped to convince
Denmark not to make any claim relating to Ellesmere Island. As for
*Professor of International Law, University of Ottawa.
1. See letter of Danish minister to Lord Curzon, dated 12 April 1920, in J. B.
HarkinPapers, Public Archives of Canada, MG 30, C 63, Vol. I, Folder July 1919
- October 1920. For a discussion of "the supposed Danish challenge to Canada's
ownership of Ellesmere Island", see Trevor Lloyd, "Knud Rasmussen and the
Arctic Islands Preserve", MUSK-OX 25, 85-90, at p. 86 (1979).
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the doubts expressed by Norway, they related to Sverdrup Islands,
which lie immediately west of Ellesmere Island in the northern part
of the archipelago. It began with a letter in 1928 from the
Norwegian consul in Montreal, who wrote to the Canadian
government and reserved all rights of Norway under international
law over Sverdrup Islands. This eventually resulted in the Canadian
government paying a certain sum to the Norwegian explorer,
Sverdrup, for his services to scientific research 2 and in an exchange
of notes in 1930 between Canada and Norway, whereby the latter
recognized Canada's sovereignty over Sverdrup Islands. Since then,
there has never been any challenge to Canada's sovereignty over the
whole of the Arctic Archipelago and Canada has been reasonably
careful in maintaining adequate control over those islands.
III. Canada'sJurisdictionOver the Arctic ContinentalShelf
Since there is no question as to Canada's full jurisdiction or
sovereignty over the Arctic Islands, there is no question either as to
Canada's exclusive jurisdiction over the continental shelf of the
archipelago. Indeed, in international law it is sovereignty over the
land area that automatically confers exclusive jurisdiction over the
natural resources of the continental shelf, the latter being a
continuation of the land territory of the coastal state into and under
the sea. In other words, the submarine areas constituting the
continental shelf are deemed to be part of the territory over which
the coastal state has sovereignty, the rationale being that the
continental shelf is merely a continuation of that territory under the
sea. 3 The international law relating to the delimitation of the shelf
was somewhat uncertain for a number of years, but, with a few
international decisions and the signing of the Law of the Sea
Convention by some 119 states in December 1982, it is gradually
becoming more settled. The problem of delimitation involves the
seaward limit of the continental shelf, and its lateral limits.
(a) SeawardLimit

The question of the seaward limit of the continental shelf is, in
effect, one of definition. The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention
2. See letter of Dr. Skelton, dated 22 May 1930, in Documents on Canadian
External Relations, 1926-1930, Vol. IV, at p. 965.
3. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) I.C.J. Rep., at p. 31, para. 43.
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defined the continental shelf as extending to a depth of 200 metres
or to the point beyond that limit at which the depth of the
superjacent waters permitted the exploitation of the natural
resources. With developing technology permitting the exploitation
of the continental shelf at ever increasing depths, the definition soon
became obsolete. In 1968, when the United Nations' Deep Seabed
Committee was formed, and for a number of years thereafter,
attempts were made to arrive at a new definition, but were without
success. It was only after the eighth session of the Third Law of the
Sea Conference, in April 1979, that a consensus was reached on
this question. The consensus is now incorporated into the new Law
of the Sea Convention, which provides for two methods to
determine the seaward limit of the continental shelf, one based on
the thickness of the sedimentary rocks (with a distance limit) and the
second on the configuration of the sea bottom. Under the first, or
geological, method, the seaward limit must not extend beyond 350
miles from shore (or, where applicable, from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured), regardless of
the actual length of the geological shelf, and, under the second, or
physiographic, method, the seaward limit must not extend more
than 100 miles beyond the 2,500-metre isobath. The 350-mile limit,
however, does not apply to submarine elevations that are the natural
components of the continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises,
caps, banks, and spurs. 4 Wide margin states, like Canada, will have
to share with the rest of the international community the revenues
from the exploitation of the resources of their continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles. The revenue-sharing formula provides
for those states to make a contribution of seven percent of the gross
revenue at the wellhead after twelve years. On the basis of the
definition just described, the arctic states in general, and Canada in
particular, will have no difficulty in obtaining most, if not all, of
their continental shelf in the Arctic Basin. Indeed, the full
continental margin (that is, the continental shelf, slope, and rise)
rarely exceeds 200 miles. It does so in the East Siberian and
Chuckchi Seas (see Map 1) and, possibly, north of Ellesmere
Island, if the Lomonosov Ridge and Alpha Ridge should turn out to
be continental in nature and continuations of the landmass.

4. See Convention of the Law of the Sea, A/CONF.62/122, 7 October 1982, art.
76.
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(b) LateralLimits
The law pertaining to continental shelf delimitation between
neighbouring states has had a rather difficult history, and the end
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result, contained in the 1982 Convention, is not very satisfactory
from the point of view of clarity. The first provision which
governed the situation was contained in the Continental Shelf
Convention of 1958. Article 6 of that convention provided that the
boundary of the continental shelf between two opposite or adjacent
states was to be determined by agreement and, in the absence of
such agreement, was to follow the median, or equidistance, line,
unless another boundary line was justified by special circumstances.
In other words, the principle of equidistance was to be the general
rule, and a modification of the equidistance line would be the
exception and permissible only when justified by special circumstances. The expression "special circumstances" was not defined in
the convention, but the International Law Commission which
prepared the draft of the convention specified three situations which
qualified as special circumstances: an exceptional configuration of
the coast, the existence of islands, and the presence of navigable
5
channels.
In 1969, the International Court of Justice had occasion to
interpret Article 6 of the convention in its judgment of the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases. Although it held that Article 6 was not
binding on Germany because the latter had not become a party to the
1958 convention and Article 6 had not become part of customary
international law, the court did refer to Article 6 as embodying "the
equidistance-special circumstances principle". 6 It did not actually
say that this constituted a single rule of delimitation, but this was
done in 1977 by a special arbitral tribunal in the English Channel
Continental Shelf Case7 between France and the United Kingdom.
The tribunal held that Article 6 of the convention provides for a
single rule, "a combined equidistance-special circumstances
rule." 8 It added that "[t]he fact that the rule is a single rule means
that the question whether 'another boundary is justified by special
circumstances' is an integral part of the rule providing for
application of the equidistance principle." 9 The 1977 arbitral
decision specified that the role of the "special circumstances"
5. SeeI.L.C. Yearbook, Vol. II (1953), at p. 216.
6. See, supra, note 3, at p. 23, para. 21.
7. The English Channel Continental Shelf Case, decision of a Special Court of
Arbitration, 30 June 1977, 236 typewritten pages.
8. Ibid, at p. 80, para. 68.
9. Ibid.
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element was to ensure an equitable delimitation and that the
combined rule "gives particular expression to a general norm that,
failing agreement, the boundary between States abutting on the
same continental shelf is to be determined by equitable
principles. ''10
Following this decision, the delegates at the Third Law of the Sea
Conference continued to be divided into two groups - perhaps
even more so than before - with regard to what should be the
method of delimitation. One group maintained that equidistance
should be the basic method of delimitation, whereas the other
argued that such delimitation should be done in accordance with
equitable principles. As a consequence, the 1979 Informal
Composite Negotiating Text provided that "the delimitation of the
continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts
shall be effected by agreement in conformity with international
law", but it added that "such an agreement shall be in accordance
with equitable principles, employing the median or equidistance
line, where appropriate, and taking account of all circumstances
prevailing in the area concerned."" This provision did not rally
sufficient support, and, on 28 August 1981, it was replaced by the
following provision, which was adopted along with the rest of the
Draft Convention on 30 April 1982: "The delimitation of the
continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts
shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as
referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.' 2 Since this
provision gives us no guideline as to how to achieve an equitable
solution, guidance must be obtained from relevant international
decisions as to what the applicable international law is. Fortunately,
the decision of the International Court of Justice of February 1982,
in the Continental Shelf Case between Tunisia and Libya, did take
into account the new provision, just quoted, as emerging law. In
that recent case the court held that "the delimitation is to be effected
in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of all
relevant circumstances.' 3 As for the meaning of "equitable
10. Ibid, atp. 81, para. 70.
11. See Informal Composite Negotiating Test, A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 1, 28
April 1979, article 83.
12. See, supra, note 4, art. 83.
13. Case Concerningthe ContinentalShelf (Tunisia/Libya), 1982 I.C.J. Rep. 18,
at p. 92, para. 133.
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principles", the court stated that, the principles being subordinate to
the goal to be attained, the equitableness of the principles to be
applied would be determined by reference to the equitableness of
the solution. 14 With respect to circumstances which may be
considered as relevant in the area to be delimited, they will, of
course, be very numerous, and so far have been held to include a
number of factors, such as the general configuration of the coasts,
the physical and geological structure, the natural resources of the
area, a reasonable proportionality between the extent of the
continental shelf and the length of the coast of a state, the size of the
area to be delimited, a marked change in the direction of a coastline
and any special configuration of the coast, the existence and
position of islands, and the land frontier between the parties, as well
as their previous conduct and attitude over a period of time. It
should be added that, in all of the problems of delimitation that have
been settled either by the International Court or by states
themselves, the equidistance method has remained the most
common mode of delimitation by far.
In summarizing the law applicable to continental shelf delimitation between neighbouring states, it may be stated that such
delimitation must be done in accordance with equitable principles,
taking into account all relevant circumstances in order to arrive at an
equitable result, and that the equidistance method (with or without
modification) has, in general, been found to produce such a result.
Applying this summary statement of the law, we shall now examine
briefly the two problems of continental shelf delimitation which
Canada has with its arctic neighbours, Denmark and the United
States.
With respect to our problem with Denmark, the continental shelf
between Greenland and Ellesmere Island has already been delimited
as far north as the Lincoln Sea, but there remains to be settled the
shelf delimitation under the Lincoln Sea itself. The part of the
continental shelf that is already delimited was determined on the
basis of the equidistance rule, modified in certain sections of the
line by taking into account the special configuration of the coasts, as
well as the presence and size of islands, in order to achieve an
equitable result. It is reasonable to assume that Canada and
Denmark will follow a similar approach in delimiting the rest of the
continental shelf in the Lincoln Sea. Should the Lomonosov Ridge
14. Ibid, at p. 59, para. 70.
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turn out to be continental in nature, the delimitation should cover
this submarine feature as well.
With respect to the delimitation problem with the United States,
that is, off the coast of Alaska and the Yukon in the Beaufort Sea,
no agreement of any kind has yet been reached. If the equidistance
principle is applied, the current delimitation line will be pulled over
towards the Canadian side, due to the slightly convex coast of
Alaska and the concave coast of the Yukon. Furthermore, there is
evidence that the concavity in question is slowly being accentuated
by a receding shoreline. It would thus appear that the special
configuration of the coast would constitute an important relevant
circumstance, and ought to justify a modification of the
equidistance line.
Also in relation to the Alaska-Yukon continental shelf delimitation, Canada has been using the 141st meridian of longitude as its
western limit for the exercise of different types of jurisdiction. In
particular, it has been used for the issuance of oil and gas
exploration permits commencing in January, 1965. The 141st
meridian has also been used, up to a distance of 100 nautical miles
from the coast, to describe, in the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act of 1970, the waters over which Canada claimed
pollution prevention jurisdiction. Then, in 1977, Canada turned to
the 141st meridian again to indicate the western limit, of up to 200
miles, for its exclusive fishing zone in the Arctic. The various uses
of the 141st meridian do not necessarily indicate that Canada is
relying on the 1825 treaty between Great Britain and Russia as
having established a maritime boundary. Indeed, a proper analysis
of the treaty, taking into account the historical context, leads to the
conclusion that the demarcation line, following the 141st meridian,
went only asfar as the Arctic Ocean. Furthermore, the parties could
not have envisaged establishing a boundary of their continental shelf
at a time when the concept itself was absolutely unknown in
international law. However, the International Court did take notice,
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, that one of four possible
methods of continental shelf delimitation considered by the
committee of experts that were consulted by the International Law
Commission was "the continuation in the seaward direction of the
land frontier."' 15 This, of course, does not mean that the United
States has to agree that the 141st meridian should be the delimitation
15. See, supra, note 3, at p. 43, para. 51.
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line. It simply means that the various factors just discussed are not
only relevant, but might be sufficiently important to justify a
modification of the equidistance line in order to attain an equitable
result.
IV. Canada'sJurisdictionOver the Arctic Waters Generally
Even if the question of Canada's jurisdiction over its Arctic Islands
and continental shelf is beyond any possible challenge, such is not
the case with respect to its claim of jurisdiction over the arctic
waters within and beyond the Arctic Islands, particularly if such
claim includes part of the Arctic Ocean.
(a) Arctic Ocean
Canada has made various claims of jurisdiction that extends
seaward to distances considerably beyond the Arctic Archipelago.
Three such claims of jurisdiction have been made, two of which
have been well-defined and reasonably well-accepted, but the third
claim, which will be the first to be addressed, is far from being
well-defined, and is certainly not generally accepted by the
international community.
(i) The Sector Theory
The sector theory has been invoked by various politicians and
officials in Canada as a possible legal basis to claim jurisdiction not
only over the islands of the Arctic Archipelago, but also over the
waters within the islands and those north of the islands, continuing
up to the North Pole. The origin of the theory is generally attributed
to Senator Pascal Poirier, who invoked it in 1907 as a basis for
claiming sovereignty over all of the islands north of Canada. This
attribution is accurate only insofar as he was the first to actually
systematize the use of meridians of longitude for the purpose of
claiming territorial sovereignty in the arctic regions. Meridians of
longitude had been made use of long before to mark the delimitation
or demarcation of territorial claims. 16 This does not mean,
however, that the theory has ever received general acceptance as a
legal basis for the validity of such claims. On the contrary, the exact
opposite would seem to be true. In the first place, reliance by states
16. See Papal Bull Inter Caetera, 4 May 1493, reproduced (English translation) in
W. M. Bush, Antarctica and International Law, Vol. 1, at p. 532 (1982), and
Treaty of Tordisellas, 7 June 1494, id., at p. 533.
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on the sector theory has been limited to a claim to lands and islands,
such as was made by the Soviet Union in 1926 and which it has long
since substantiated by application of the traditional principle for the
acquisition of territorial sovereignty, namely, effective occupation
and control. In the second place, states have not relied on the sector
theory to claim part of the oceans. As far as Canada is concerned,
no government has ever taken a very clear and consistent stand as to
the legal validity of the sector theory and, in particular, as to the
possibility that it might be a basis for a claim to the water areas
within a Canadian sector, The position of the present government
seems to be that the sector theory should be held in reserve as a
possible support, and that nothing should be done to undermine any
possible legal value it might have. However, the general opinion of
publicists and informed commentators is that the sector theory has
no legal validity as a source of title in international law, and cannot
serve as a legal basis for the acquisition of sovereignty over land
and, a fortiori, over sea areas. It is not surprising, therefore, that in
all of the years of discussion at the Law of the Sea Conference,
including several years of preparatory negotiations extending back
to 1968, Canada has never made any reference to the sector theory,
and neither has any other state, including the polar ones. Indeed,
two of the arctic states, the United States and Norway, have long
ago expressed definite disapproval of the sector theory, even as a
basis to claim jurisdiction over land. A third arctic state, Denmark,
refused to rely on the theory in its dispute with Norway over eastern
Greenland, in 1933, before the International Court of Justice. My
own personal conclusion is that the sector theory has no validity as a
legal root of title, whether it be in respect of land or water, and
Canada would be well-advised to abandon any hope of gaining legal
support from that theory in the event of any dispute with respect to
7
jurisdictional claims in the Arctic. '
(ii) Pollution Prevention Zone, 1970
In 1970, the Canadian Parliament unanimously adopted the Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act, thereby giving Canada jurisdiction for pollution prevention purposes up to 100 miles in the Arctic
Ocean off of the Arctic Archipelago and the mainland of northern
Canada. In 1972, Canada established shipping safety control zones
17. See Part I in The Waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago in International
Law, to be published in book form by the present writer.
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(see Map 2), and specified certain standards for navigation within
those zones. Because the United States had objected strongly to
such a claim of jurisdiction, Canada thereupon embarked on intense
diplomatic efforts in a number of international fora to obtain
recognition of international law principles which would serve as a
basis for its legislation. These efforts were pursued mainly in
international conferences, and culminated in the insertion of a
special arctic clause into the Law of the Sea Convention.' 8 That
special clause provides that coastal states may adopt special
protective measures in certain ice-covered areas within their
exclusive economic zone if exceptional hazards to navigation and
marine pollution can cause irreversible disturbance of the ecological
balance. The provision enables coastal states to enforce such
protective measures themselves, instead of leaving the enforcement
to the flag state. This provision has now rallied a sufficiently wide
consensus in the international community that it may be considered
as part of customary international law. The United States, however,

Map 2: Shipping Safety Control Zones
18. For a reproduction and discussion of this provision, see, infra, IV-Canada's
Jurisdiction over the Northwest Passage.
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having decided to remain outside the Law of the Sea Convention,
could well challenge the legal status of that provision and, at the
same time, Canada's legislation.
(iii) Exclusive Fishing Zone, 1977
On January 1, 1977, Canada extended its fishing jurisdiction to 200
nautical miles on the east and west coasts, and, on March 1 of the
same year, it established an arctic fishing zone. Although Canada
took the precaution of concluding bilateral agreements before 1977
with states traditionally fishing off its east and west coasts, this
action was not necessary in relation to the arctic fishing zone, since,
in fact, no commercial fishing took place in that zone. Furthermore,
the concept of a 200-mile fishing zone is part and parcel of a wider
concept, namely, that of the exclusive economic zone on which
there has already been a very wide consensus at the Law of the Sea
Conference for some five or six years. Indeed, perhaps this is the
area in which a consensus has been established most strongly at the
conference. Even after its decision not to become a party to the
Convention, the United States issued a Presidential Proclamation
adopting a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. 19 In the circumstances, the international validity of Canada's 200-mile fishing zone
cannot be attacked.
(b) Ice Islands
A considerable number of ice islands have been located in the Arctic
Ocean and most of them appear to have originated from ice shelves
off the north coast of Ellesmere Island. 20 Those ice islands have
been used by the Soviet Union and the United States for carrying out
marine scientific research. The United States has operated five such
ice islands so far, and the number used by the Soviet Union has now
reached twenty-five (see Map 3). Canada, for its part, is presently
conducting its second scientific expedition aboard an ice floe, about
200 miles to the east of the Soviet ice island NP-25. The purpose of
the Canadian Expedition to Study the Alpha Ridge (CESAR) is to
19. The White House Fact Sheet, released 10 March 1983, specified that "the
concept of the EEZ is already recognized in international law and the President's
Proclamation is consistent with existing international law".
20. See G. Hattersley-Smith, "Comments on the Origin of the Ice Islands", 5
ARCTIC 95-103 (1952) and Martin Jeffries, "The Ward Hunt Ice Shelf, Spring
1982", 35 ARCTIC 542-544 (1982).
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determine if this submarine feature is of continental or oceanic
origin.
Since it is impossible to control the movements of such ice
islands (and, a fortiori, simple ice floes), the drift of which depends
on the currents and the wind, the question arises as to what control,
if any, the coastal state may exercise over the activities on such ice
islands when they come within its adjacent waters. The question did
arise in July 1970, when a homicide took place on the American ice
island, T-3, within the so-called Canadian sector, approximately
185 nautical miles north of the Arctic Archipelago. The American
government did not hesitate to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
the accused person, and neither did the American courts. The latter,
however, did not deal specifically with the question of jurisdiction
in international law, and it was not really necessary for them to do
so, since the Canadian government had made an express waiver of
jurisdiction in the case. 2 ' Such a waiver was quite proper for at least

Map 3: Drift Pathsof Soviet North Pole Stations (1937-1973)
21. The waiver specified, however, that Canada continued to reserve its position
on the question of jurisdiction over the alleged offense, but that it did not object to
having the drifting ice island considered as a ship for the purpose of the
proceedings.
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two reasons: first, Canada could not have justified any territorial
jurisdiction on the basis of the sector theory, and second, both the
victim and the accused were of American nationality. Consequently, the United States was quite justified in exercising personal
22
jurisdiction, even if the offence took place outside its territory.
Aside from any question of criminal offence among members of
the crew of an ice island, the question might arise as to Canada's
jurisdiction over other activities on such an ice island when it is in
waters adjacent to its coast. The question did arise in 1977, when an
ice island being operated by the Soviet Union, NP-22, drifted within
200 miles of the Canadian islands. It would seem that, in such a
case, the coastal state can have no more jurisdiction over the
activities of such an ice island than it would have if it were a ship.
Indeed, until such time as ice islands acquire a definite status in
international law, the analogy with ships would appear to be the
most adequate one. In other words, the principle of the exclusive
jurisdiction of the flag state would apply. However, if the activities
being carried out are in violation of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
coastal state, the latter would be completely justified in intervening.
Such would have been the case in 1977 if the Soviet Union had been
exploring Canada's continental shelf, contrary to the 1958
Convention, or had been engaged in fishing (if there had been any
fish in that zone) within the exclusive fishing zone of 200 miles.
Canada would also have jurisdiction over such an ice island within
its 100-mile pollution prevention zone if the activities on the ice
island threatened Canada's marine environment, contrary to the
legislation of 1970. It is not impossible either that Canada might
legitimately allege jurisdiction, under the general principles of
international law relating to self-defense and self-protection, if the
activities on an ice island were to constitute an actual threat to its
national security.
(c) Waters of the CanadianArctic Archipelago
Canada has not yet established its territorial sea in the Arctic, and
until it does, the question arises as to exactly what the legal status of
the waters of the archipelago is.

22. For a more complete treatment of this case, see Donat Pharand, The Law of the
Sea of the Arctic, with Special Reference to Canada (Ottawa: University of Ottawa
Press, 1973) at pp. 199-204.
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(i) PresentStatus
It will be recalled that, in 1970, shortly after the American ship
Manhattan had crossed the Northwest Passage in order to reach
Prudhoe Bay, Canada extended its territorial waters from three to
twelve miles. It was stated at that time by the legal adviser of the
Department of External Affairs, as well as by the Secretary of State
for External Affairs, that the effect of the legislation was to create a
territorial waters gate in Barrow Strait at those points where the
distance between Lowther and Young Islands is less than
twenty-four miles. 2 3 If such is the case, then the remaining waters
of the Northwest Passage would presumably have the status of high
seas where the distance between islands is more than twenty-four
miles. However, Canada has given a number of indications since
then that it considers the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago
to be internal waters. In December, 1973, the Bureau of Legal
Affairs of the Department of External Affairs wrote that "Canada
also claims that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are
internal waters of Canada, on an historical basis, although they have
' 24
not been declared as such in any treaty or by any legislation."
This view was confirmed in May, 1975, by the Secretary of State
for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen, when he stated in front of
the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and
National Defence that the arctic waters were considered by Canada
as being its "internal waters". 25 This appears to have been the first
clear statement made on the question by a member of the
government. It represented Canada's position, and apparently still
does.
23. See the statement of J. Alan Beesley in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of Standing Committee on ExternalAffairs and National Defense, No. 25, 29 April
1970, at p. 18. See also the statement by Mitchell Sharp in Canadian House of
Commons Debates, 17 April 1970, at p. 6015. A first gate of territorial waters
already existed in Prince of Wales Strait, where the presence of the small Princess
Royal Islands reduces the width to less than six miles.
24. Reproduced in 12 CanadianYearbook ofInternationalLaw at p. 279 (1974).
25. See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on
ExternalAffairs and NationalDefense, No. 24, 22 May 1975, at p. 6. A previous,
but less definite, statement had been made by the Secretary of State for External
Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, in April 1970, in answer to questions in the House of
Commons. He stated at first that the waters within the archipelago were Canadian
internal waters, but then, in answer to a subsequent question, agreed that there
might be territorial waters around the Arctic Islands. See Canadian House of
Commons Debate, 16 April 1970, at pp. 5953-5954.
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As indicated in the 1973 Memorandum from the Bureau of Legal
Affairs, Canada's claim is based on an historical title. Indeed, since
Canada has not yet drawn straight baselines around its Arctic
Archipelago, this could be the only legal basis. It is true that Canada
is certainly in a position to invoke the fact that it performed a
number of manifestations of sovereignty, at least as far back as the
beginning of the century, in support of such a claim, and, in
particular, that it enforced fisheries and whaling legislation in the
Eastern Arctic as far back as the Low expedition in 1904. It can also
point to the fact that, after World War II, it took the precaution of
exercising control over the movement of ships in those waters,
particularly of American ships involved in supplying weather
stations to the Queen Elizabeth Islands. Whether these and similar
activities, including the long-standing use of sea ice by its Inuit for
fishing and hunting, would be considered sufficient to meet the
stringent legal requirements for the proof of historic waters is
another question. Indeed, it is generally agreed that at least two
basic requirements must be met before a claim to historic waters is
established: the exercise of exclusive authority and control by the
claimant state over a long period of time, and acquiescence by
foreign states, particularly those affected by the claim in question.
In view, however, of the United States' traditional attitude towards
the status of those waters and the official protest, in 1970, when
Canada extended its territorial waters to twelve miles, it would be
rather difficult for Canada to successfully prove its claim of internal
waters on the basis of an historical title alone. 26 The best approach
would seem to be to draw straight baselines around the Arctic
Archipelago and to point to Canada's historic activities in those
waters as additional support only.
(ii) FutureStatus, After Encircling With StraightBaselines
As already indicated, it would seem that the best legal basis on
which Canada could claim exclusive jurisdiction or sovereignty
over the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago would be to
encircle the archipelago with straight baselines from which it would
then measure its territorial sea. Of course, this would mean drawing
a certain number of baselines of considerable length, in particular,
the following: ninety-two miles across Amundsen Gulf; ninety-two
26. For a more complete treatment of this question, see, supra, note 22, at pp.
99-144.
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miles at the entrance of M'Clure Strait; and fifty-one miles across
Lancaster Sound (see Map 4). In justifying such straight baselines,
Canada has the choice of relying on either the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case of 195127 or the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention.
The latter being essentially a codification of the decision in the
Fisheries Case, its provisions have been retained in the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention. Conceivably, Canada could also rely on the
provisions of the 1982 Convention which pertain to archipelagic
states, but this would not be advisable, since virtually complete
freedom of passage would apply in the enclosed waters. As for the
choice between the first two alternatives, it would seem preferable
for Canada to rely on the FisheriesCase of 1951 for two reasons.
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Map 4: StraightBaselinesAround Arctic Archipelago
First, the legal result is a preferable one, in that Canada would
have complete sovereignty over the enclosed waters, although it
might very well permit innocent passage and, indeed, probably
should, but would not have to. Second, there would seem to be
more flexibility under the court's judgment to meet the geographic
27. See 1951 1.C.J. Rep. 4.
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requirements than there is under the Territorial Sea Convention.
Canada could emphasize the very special geographic and physical
characteristics of its Arctic Archipelago in order to convince a
tribunal that those islands do constitute an integral part of the
mainland of Canada and cannot be separated for the purpose of
delimiting territorial waters. The International Court proved to be
quite receptive to this line of argument in the Fisheries Case,
particularly when it stated that "the drawing of straight baselines
must be adapted to the special conditions obtaining in different
regions." ' 28 Canada would have to admit, of course, that its Arctic
Archipelago is not composed of a string of islands along its coast, as
is the case for Norway, and would have to argue that the law
applicable to straight baselines must be adapted to the special
conditions obtaining in the Canadian arctic region. An important
part of those special conditions is the fact that the archipelagic
waters in question are frozen solid for some nine months of the year,
thus enhancing the physical unity of the archipelago and reducing
the logic of attempting to delineate territorial waters around the
individual islands.
V. Canada'sJurisdictionOver the Northwest Passage
Considering the preparations now being made by both Canada and
the United States to eventually transport hydrocarbons from the
Beaufort Sea through the Northwest Passage, it becomes important
for Canada to examine the extent to which it may exercise
jurisdiction over that series of straits and sounds which constitute
the passage.
(a) Main Routes
The Northwest Passage consists of five basic routes, in addition to
at least two variations of those routes (see Map 5). All of the routes
are potentially feasible for navigation, but not all of them are
suitable for deep-draft ships. At the moment, only two of them,
Routes 1 and 2, which might be referred to as the northern routes,
are known to be so suitable. Route 3 (and its variation, 3A) and
Route 4 might be considered to be the southern routes, since they
follow the continental coast of Canada for more than half the
distance and are not suitable for deep-draft navigation. As for Route
28. Ibid, at p. 21.
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5, it presently leads only to Routes 3 and 4. However, if
hydrographic surveys should indicate sufficient depth in Fury and
Hecla Strait, its variation, Route 5A, could lead to Routes 1 and 2.
It could then be used by deep-draft ships and could become a viable
alternative to Lancaster Sound.

Map 5: Main Routes of the Northwest Passage
(b) PresentStatus
If the Northwest Passage is an international strait, the applicable
freedom of passage is virtually the same as that on the high seas. If
this were not the case, a mere right of innocent passage would exist.
Keeping in mind the test formulated and applied by the International
Court in the Corfu Channel Case of 1949,29 namely, that a strait
must have been a useful route for international maritime traffic
before it can be considered as an international strait, it appears quite
obvious and beyond question that the few transits of the Northwest
Passage since Amundsen's first crossing in 1903-06 are not
sufficient to turn it into an international strait. Indeed, only
thirty-five complete crossings are known to have been made so
29. See (1949) I.C.J. Rep. 4.
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far. 3 0 All of these were experimental in nature, and only one vessel,
the SIT Manhattan, in 1969, was a commercial ship. Of the
thirty-five transits, only eleven were made by foreign flags and they
took place with Canada's consent or acquiescence.
Of the eleven foreign crossings, eight were American. These
included the 1957 crossing by a squadron of three U.S. icebreakers
(Storis, Spar, and Bramble), with the assistance of the Canadian
naval icebreaker, Labrador;the submarine crossing of 1960 by the
Seadragon, with a Canadian government representative aboard; the
1962 submarine crossing of the Skate, within the context of
Canada-U.S. defense arrangements; and the 1969 round trip of the
Manhattan, which had a Canadian representative aboard and
received the assistance of the Canadian icebreaker, Macdonald. For
its return trip, the Manhattan was also accompanied by the
American icebreaker, Staten Island, thus making eight crossings by
American ships. As for the three other foreign crossings, the first
one was made in 1903-06 by the Norwegian herring boat, Gjoa,
while commanded by the explorer Amundsen, in order to prove the
navigability of the Northwest Passage. The second one was made by
the small sailboat, Williwa, in 1977, the skipper of which had
obtained express permission. The last foreign vessel to complete the
passage was a small Japanese yacht, Mermaid, which had
considerable difficulty and took two years, 1979-81, to effect the
transit.
On the basis of the above, one has to conclude that by no stretch
of the imagination could these few foreign crossings constitute
sufficient commercial use to turn the Northwest Passage into an
international strait. Indeed, not a single one of those passages was
made for commercial navigation, including that of the Manhattan in
1969, since the ship carried no oil whatsoever and the trip was
strictly an experimental passage. Those who maintain that the
Northwest Passage may already be classified as an international
strait obviously confuse actual use with potential use. The latter is
the criterion used by the American courts to determine whether a
waterway is navigable or not. 31 However, the criterion used by the
International Court is that of actual use, and it is the one to be
applied here.
30. Based on a list compiled by Captain T. C. Pullen, R.C.N. (ret.).
31. The distinction is made clearly by R. R. Baxter in his book, The Law of
International Waterways, at p. 3 (1964).
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(c) FutureStatus, After Use for InternationalNavigation

Should the Northwest Passage become an international strait, the
new right of "transit passage" would become applicable. This new
right, which evolved at the Third Law of the Sea Conference and
has been incorporated in the 1982 Convention, has replaced the
non-suspendable right of innocent passage which is presently
applicable to international straits.
Under the Territorial Sea Convention of 1958, there is a right of
innocent passage in favour of all foreign ships which move through
straits used for international navigation, and such passage must not
be suspended. This right extends to warships under both the
Territorial Sea Convention and customary law, as confirmed by the
International Court in the Corfu Channel Case of 1949. But, also
under that convention, submarines are required to navigate on the
surface and show their flags. Under the provisions of the 1982
Convention, the right of "transit passage" (and, in the case of
oceanic archipelagoes constituting a state, "sea lanes passage")
will afford foreign ships virtually the same freedom of navigation as
that which they now possess on the high seas. 3 2 This passage must
not be impeded in any way by the coastal or archipelagic state. In
addition, foreign ships may exercise that right in their normal mode
of passage. 3 3 Since this right is applicable to all ships, including
icebreakers, warships, and submarines, it means that the latter will
be able to go through such straits while submerged. It should also be
noted that this new right of transit gives a parallel right of overflight
to aircraft, which presently enjoy no such right. In short, if transit
passage becomes applicable in the Northwest Passage, Canada
would have virtually no control over foreign ships, other than
tankers, because of the special arctic clause.
Fortunately for Canada, even if the regime of transit passage were
to apply to the Northwest Passage, Canada would still have
considerable powers, under the special provision of the 1982
Convention, to prevent and control pollution. This well-known
"ice-covered area" provision, the acceptance of which the
Canadian delegation worked hard to obtain and for which it must
have had to bargain, reads as follows:
Coastal states have the right to establish and enforce nondiscriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction
32. See, supra, note 4, articles 38 and 53.
33. Ibid, art. 39, para. 1.
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and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas
within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where
particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice
covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or
exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine
environment could cause major 34harm to or irreversible
disturbance of the ecological balance.
It will be noted that these powers of the coastal state extend not
only to the establishment of standards, but also to their
enforcement, and the standards may be more stringent than those
otherwise permitted by international law. This special provision
was, of course, intended to legitimize, on the international plane,
the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970, which gave
Canada extensive powers of standard-setting and enforcement. In
1970, and until recently, some doubt existed as to the international
legal validity of such regulations, particularly because they applied
to a sea area which extends up to 100 nautical miles from the coast
and where the principle of exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state had
traditionally applied. However, the Canadian regulations have now
rallied a wide consensus on the international plane and have been
legitimized by the insertion, into the 1982 Convention, of the
special, "ice-covered areas" provision.
The pollution prevention zone established by the regulations
covers all of the Northwest Passage, since it applies to waters which
lie north of the sixtieth parallel and between the 141st meridian of
longitude in the west, and, in the east, the equidistance line between
the Canadian Arctic Islands and Greenland. This legislation
empowers Canada to impose stringent preventive measures against
the possibility of oil spills, either from marine transportation by
tanker or from land-based and offshore resource development
activities. Pursuant to this legislation, Canada established shipping
safety control zones (see Map 2) and specified the standards ships
must meet before they may be permitted to navigate in those
zones. 35 The standards cover such features as hull and fuel tank
construction, navigation equipment, navigation personnel, and the
quantity and nature of the cargo to be carried. The regulations
further specify what class of ship may navigate in what zone and at
what time of year. For instance, only ships classified as Arctic Class
34. Ibid, article 234.

35. See Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations, S.O.R./72-426,
CanadaGazette, Part II, Vol. 106, No. 20, at p. 1847 (25 October 1972).
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10 and complying with the standards specified for that class are
admissible in Zone I throughout the year. Zone I includes M'Clure
Strait, north of Banks Island at the western end of the Northwest
Passage. No tanker may navigate within any of the zones without
the aid of an ice navigator who has had previous experience as a
master while the ship was operating in ice conditions. Finally, no
owner or master of any ship may enter any zone unless he has
obtained a certificate of standards of the form set out in the
regulations.
In addition to the above, it is important to note that the special
provision in question occupies a completely independent position in
the Convention, and is unaffected by the other provisions relating to
international straits. More specifically, even if the Northwest
Passage were to become an international strait, the special arctic
clause would still enable Canada to apply its pollution prevention
regulations of 1972. That special clause was inserted into the
Negotiating Text of 1976, and has been kept without change in all
the subsequent Negotiating Texts of 1977, 1979, and 1980.
Considering the wide consensus which the clause received,
particularly on the part of other arctic states (including the United
States, which had strongly opposed Canada's 1970 legislation), it
may now be regarded as part of customary international law, and
completely validates Canada's legislation.36
In spite of the guarantee just described, however, the future of the
Northwest Passage is not necessarily adequately protected. With
regard to the contemplated use of the Northwest Passage and the
possibility of it becoming an international strait, the question arises
as to whether Canada would have adequate protection under the
special arctic clause and, if not, what measures it could take to gain
such protection. In the first place, Canada would have practically no
control over military vessels and aircraft if the Northwest Passage
were to become an international strait, since they would benefit
from the principle of sovereign immunity. And, as previously
indicated, submarines would have the right of submerged passage.
They have no such right now, since the passage is not an
international strait, although this does not mean that the waters of
36. For a study of the international validity of this provision, see Donat Pharand,
La contribution du Canada au developpement du droit international pour la
protection du milieu marin: le cas special de l'Arctique, 11 Etudes internationales

441-466 (1980).
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the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are not already visited by
submerged submarines. In addition, Canada would have little
control over foreign icebreakers. This would be so particularly if its
own icebreaking capability were not sufficient to commend it to
foreign users of the passage.
VI. Canada'sJurisdictionOver the Arctic Airspace

As a general principle, it may be stated that the legal status of the
airspace is governed by the legal status of the subjacent land and
water areas. The basic rule of international law is that the
sovereignty of the subjacent state extends to the airspace above its
territory and territorial waters. This means that there is no right of
overflight for foreign aircraft. Since territorial sovereignty over the
Canadian Arctic Islands is well established, Canada's jurisdiction
over the airspace above those islands is as complete as that over the
islands themselves. In other words, there is no freedom of overflight
over the Arctic Islands, nor over the territorial waters of those
islands. With regard to jurisdiction above the continental shelf, the
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf specifies that the rights of
the coastal state over the natural resources of the continental shelf
do not affect the status of the superjacent airspace and, therefore,
the traditional freedom of overflight remains. This freedom has
been retained in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. 3 7 There is no
doubt that the waters of the exclusive economic zone and, a fortiori,
those of the exclusive fishing zone, remain subject to the freedoms
of navigation and overflight, as above the high seas. 38 Finally, there
is at the moment, and even assuming that the waters of the passage
are not internal waters, no freedom of overflight in Barrow Strait
where there is a barrier of territorial waters. There is also no such
freedom over Prince of Wales Strait east of Banks Island, where
there is an overlap of territorial waters as well. Should the
Northwest Passage become an international strait, however, the new
right of "transit passage" would apply, and this would mean a
freedom of overflight in favour of all aircraft.

37. See, supra, note 4, art. 78.

38. Ibid, art. 58.
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(a) Jurisdiction Within the Distant Early Warning Identification
Zone
At least twelve states 39 have now adopted identification zones for
aircraft which extend considerable distances over the high seas, and
two of the five arctic states have adopted such zones, namely, the
United States and Canada. The United States was the first country to
adopt, in 1950, an air defense identification zone, and its present
zone off of Alaska extends to approximately 380 nautical miles
from the Alaskan coast. Canada followed suit in 1951, and its
present distant early warning identification zone extends to the
Beaufort Sea, to a distance of approximately 185 nautical miles (see
Map 6). The jurisdiction exercised by Canada within the
identification zone in question imposes an obligation on the pilot in
command of an aircraft, operated at a true airspeed of 180 knots or
more, to file a flight plan before taking off from the location he was
last at prior to penetrating the zone. He must also make a position
report by radio-telephone communication during flight, and must
indicate any difference as to the estimated time and place of the
zone penetration.
No precise legal basis for the establishment of such identification
zones over the high seas may be found in conventions, but it does
appear that such zones have found a legal basis in customary
international law. They have been adopted by a number of states,
and have been respected and submitted to by a large number of
states, including the major powers. More specifically, not only has
there not been protest on the part of interested states, but, on the
contrary, there has been general acquiescence and submission. In
the circumstances and with the passing of some thirty years since
the beginning of this practice, which is based on the general right of
self-protection, one must conclude that the zones are permitted in
40
general international law.
39. The twelve states are Burma, Canada, Iceland, India, Japan, Korea, Oman,
the Philippines, Sweden, Taiwan, the United States, and Vietnam. The Soviet
Union announced that it would adopt an air defence identification zone after the
incident of the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance flight in 1960, but did not do so.
France adopted such a zone at one time off the Algerian coast, but abandoned it in
1956 when Algeria became independent.
40. For a more complete discussion of the legal basis for air defence identification
zones, see Donat Pharand, The Legal Status of the Arctic Regions, 163 Recueil des
cours 53, at pp. 108-111 (1979).

340 The Dalhousie Law Journal

VII. Conclusion
Having completed this overview, let us try to summarize what the
extent of Canada's jurisdiction in the Arctic is, and project briefly
how it might develop in the future. Canada has, unquestionably,
complete sovereignty over all of the islands constituting the Arctic
Archipelago, including the group of islands north of the Parry
Channel, known as the Queen Elizabeth Islands. This sovereignty
extends to the airspace above all of the islands. In addition, Canada
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exercises a limited form of jurisdiction within a distant early
warning identification zone, extending over the adjacent part of the
Beaufort Sea. This type of jurisdiction is now recognized in
customary international law.
Flowing from its territorial sovereignty, Canada has exclusive
rights over the natural resources of its continental shelf, which
extends, on the average, for over a hundred miles off its arctic
territory and islands. Canada's jurisdiction might extend considerably beyond that, should it turn out that certain submarine ridges
which project into the Arctic Basin are of continental, rather than
oceanic, origin. However, Canada must still establish a lateral
delimitation of its continental shelf with its arctic neighbours - in
the Beaufort Sea, with the United States, and, in the Lincoln Sea,
with Denmark. This delimitation will be accomplished either by
agreement or by a decision of an international tribunal, in
accordance with principles of international law. These principles are
still somewhat imprecise, but are in the process of being developed
by the International Court of Justice. Regardless of the exact mode
of delimitation that will eventually be used, the equidistance method
is bound to play a central role.
As to the extent of Canada's jurisdiction over the arctic waters,
the legal situation is not altogether clear at present. On the one
hand, Canada is perfectly justified in claiming a 100-mile pollution
prevention zone, as well as a 200-mile exclusive fishing zone; both
of these zones are now recognized by customary international law.
On the other hand, the precise legal status of the waters within the
Canadian Arctic Archipelago, including those of the Northwest
Passage, is not as well established. Canada's claim is that those
waters have the status of internal waters, over which it has complete
sovereignty on the basis of an historic title. However, the proof of
such a title is difficult and remains to be made.
Now that the Third Law of the Sea Conference is over, it is
suggested that Canada ought to draw straight baselines around the
Arctic Archipelago, from which it could measure its 12-mile
territorial sea and within which the waters would be internal in
nature. The status of internal waters would, of course, apply to the
Northwest Passage. Such straight baselines would be justified in
customary international law, in light of the state practice and the
1951 decision of the International Court of Justice in the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case between Norway and the United
Kingdom. In addition, Canada could gain legal support from the
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historic use of the sea ice over those waters by the Inuit.
If Canada does not take the necessary steps to clarify the status of
those waters before foreign ships begin to transport hydrocarbons
through the Northwest Passage, the latter will likely develop into an
international strait to which the new right of transit passage will
apply. Although Canada would, in that event, still have
anti-pollution jurisdiction over tankers, it could exercise very little
control over foreign icebreakers and warships, including submerged
submarines. Indeed, under the new right of transit passage, as
opposed to the traditional right of innocent passage, submarines
would no longer have any obligation to surface during transit.
Without wanting, in any way, to magnify the danger, such a
situation could be somewhat worrisome with regard to the security
of Canada.

